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Abstract
After the Spanish Civil War, poor 
hygiene and nutritional deficiencies 
among a large part of Spain’s population 
contributed to the rise of epidemic 
diseases. Exanthematic typhus posed 
a challenge to the health authorities, 
especially during the spring of 1941, 
when the epidemiological cycle of the 
disease and the lack of infrastructures 
combined to create a serious health 
crisis. The Franco regime, aware that this 
situation posed a threat to its legitimacy, 
promptly used social exclusion as part 
of its health policy against the epidemic. 
This article provides an in-depth analysis 
of the case of Valencia, a city that was 
behind Republican lines during the war, 
and therefore received successive waves 
of refugees as Franco’s troops advanced.
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It is well-known that a population’s state of health is affected not only by biological factors but is also closely linked to its political, economic and social situation. In Spain, that link 
became clearer after the Civil War (1936-1939), which left the majority of the country in 
poverty and put General Francisco Franco (1892-1975) in power. Once the Second Republic 
(1931-1939) was over thrown, he instituted a fascist-style military dictatorship, which 
remained in place for much of the Cold War, lasting nearly four decades. The Director 
General for Health under the first Franco government, José Alberto Palanca (1888-1973), 
stated in 1941 that “a country’s state of health is not isolated and unconnected to its social 
and economic circumstances, but is, on the contrary, a consequence of them” (Palanca, 
1941, p.432). The resurgence of smallpox, diphtheria and exanthematic typhus immediately 
after the war was merely one more sign of the hardships, especially hunger, facing a large 
part of the population (Del Cura Gómez, Huertas García, 2007, p.17, 181). There was also 
a surge in other diseases, such as typhoid fever and tuberculosis, which were endemic in 
Spain before the war (Barona Vilar, 2001, p.350).
However, these adverse social and medical circumstances belied the image of a robust 
fatherland being preached by the regime, so the propaganda apparatus took pains to 
link these diseases to the war’s losing side, thus evading any responsibility for their 
appearance. Despite the rivalries and internal disagreements between the different political 
factions within Francoism, Spain’s health authorities allied themselves with the medical 
internationalism of the “New Europe” led by Nazi Germany in the early years of Second 
World War (Brydan, 2016). As we shall see, exanthematic typhus played a central role in 
this social control strategy, and subsequently in a policy that legitimized authoritarianism 
and coercion of the population. It was a high-mortality disease characterized by high 
fever, diminished consciousness and liver failure, which led to death in the course of a 
few days. Transmitted by lice, it was seen as the paradigm of a disease associated with 
poor hygiene in the trenches and concentration camps, but also with unhealthy housing 
conditions among the poor and with poverty in general. It was inseparable from hunger 
and overcrowding. The close relationship of this disease to the most disadvantaged sector 
of the population has been identified as one of the reasons why typhus was used as the 
main health argument for ideological reaffirmation (Jiménez Lucena, 1994, p.190). It is 
well-known that after the war, the regime identified the most vulnerable sectors of the 
population as having supported the Republic and thus as enemies of the new Spain. Also, 
during that phase, the state’s ideological apparatus functioned primarily to legitimize the 
new regime, a goal that was pursued by applying social exclusion mechanisms.
Repression has been identified by historians as a key part of the construction of the 
Francoist state (Mir Curcó, 2001). After the Republic was overthrown, there was a systematic 
purge of state organizations, professional bodies and labor unions, with opponents of the 
regime being punished retroactively. As a result, Spain’s incarcerated population soared: 
inmates were crowded together, in dreadfully unsanitary conditions, in prisons and 
concentration camps. The main purpose of the sentences passed was political and religious 
indoctrination (Rodrigo, 2013). Although fewer women were jailed, female imprisonment 
in separate penitentiary facilities was aimed at subjecting the inmates to moral coercion 
exerted by nuns of different religious orders (Hernández Holgado, 2013).
Public health, urban space and social exclusion in postwar Spain
v.26, n.2, abr.-jun. 2019 3
This article belongs within the historiographical approach that identifies early Francoist 
health policy as one more element of repression and propaganda on the part of the new 
regime (Marset Campos, Sáez Gómez, Martínez Navarro, 1995; Jiménez Lucena, 1998, p.111-
126). Broadly speaking, it has been pointed out that social exclusion of opponents of the 
regime took place from the beginning, as the Franco dictatorship set out to rebuild Spain’s 
health care structure in order to place health experts from the winning side in positions of 
power (Serrallonga Urquidi, 2007). In the particular case of the anti-silicosis campaign in 
the early years of Franco’s rule, the regime’s social policy was basically propaganda-driven 
– minimizing the benefits of national health care (Menéndez Navarro, 2008). The battle 
against tuberculosis was a similar case; even though the social origin of tuberculosis was 
known, the Francoist health authorities focused on therapeutic responses to the disease, 
neglecting preventive measures. The Francoist state’s campaign against tuberculosis was 
geared toward propaganda and short-term political indoctrination, which meant it was more 
politically profitable to increase investment in highly visible infrastructures (dispensaries 
and tuberculosis sanatoriums), than to invest in social policies, especially low-income 
housing (Molero Mesa, 1991, 1994, 2001; García Ferrandis, 2013).
In terms of exanthematic typhus, Isabel Jiménez Lucena’s (1990, 1994) work on Malaga, 
one of the major cities in Andalusia, constitutes an obligatory reference point for this article. 
This researcher demonstrated how a situation that was initially a problem for the regime was 
manipulated in various ways in order to reaffirm the ideological principles of the winning side.
The official line of the Francoist health authorities, as stated by the Director General 
for Health, was that during the war, “in contrast to what occurred on the Republican side, 
in the Nationalist zone people ate well” (Palanca, 1941, p.432); this was used to justify the 
claim that the epidemic was caused by “the mental and physical suffering that occurred 
during the war years in the Red zone, undernourishment, and the displacement of large 
numbers of people when the war ended, which determined the outbreak of the epidemic” 
(Palanca, 1943b, p.361).
According to this view, the incidence of typhus in other Andalusian cities like Granada, 
Seville or Cadiz (occupied by the Insurgents early in the war) should have been minimal, but in 
reality, as we shall see, it was very high; whereas, on the other hand, the typhus epidemic 
in Valencia should have caused extremely high numbers of cases. Since it was a bastion of 
the Republican rearguard throughout the conflict, the capital of Valencia was systematically 
bombed and took in thousands of refugees, which led to food and housing shortages. However, 
our work shows that morbimortality rates in Valencia were in fact rather moderate.
This article has two objectives: firstly, to determine the intensity of the epidemic of 
exanthematic typhus that occurred in the city of Valencia in the spring of 1941 and lasted 
until 1943, in comparison to other Spanish cities; and secondly, to analyze the response of 
the Valencian authorities to this health crisis. This is a new case-study, based on the previous 
one done for Malaga. To meet these proposed objectives, we shall begin by providing a 
brief overview of the outbreak and development of the typhus epidemic in postwar Spain 
(1939-1943), and the institutional response to this serious health threat. It is important to 
provide the wider context before dealing in more depth with the Valencia area, which is 
covered in the second part of the article.
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We consulted unpublished documents in the Archive of the Provincial Council 
(Diputación Provincial) of Valencia and the city’s Municipal Archive. We also consulted 
published medical sources, especially articles that appeared in the Semana Médica Española 
and some of the numerous monographs on exanthematic typhus that were published in 
the early 1940s. Among all the sources consulted, one of the most important, as we show 
later, is an article published in late 1943 by Javier Vidal Jordana, an epidemiologist at the 
Provincial Institute for Hygiene in Valencia, in the Revista de Sanidad e Higiene Pública, 
the official publication of the Directorate General for Health (Vidal Jordana, 1943), and the 
speech he gave on June 7, 1946, when he was inducted into the Valencian Royal Academy 
of Medicine (Vidal Jordana, 1946).
The exanthematic typhus epidemic in postwar Spain (1941-1943)
Historians of Francoism have identified autarky as the main cause of economic stagnation 
in the early years of the lengthy post-war period in Spain. The most devastating collateral 
effect of this was hunger (Palacio Lis, Ruiz Rodrigo, 1993; Barona Vilar, J., 2001, 2006; 
Del Arco Blanco, 2006, p.244; Del Cura Gómez, Huertas García, 2007). The existence of 
hunger is very important to our research, since nutritional deficits are closely linked to the 
outbreak of infectious diseases, because malnutrition normally affects the immune system.
Another factor that encouraged the outbreak of the typhus epidemic in 1941, besides 
the large-scale population displacement seen in the war, was poor hygiene, since personal 
cleanliness in general and delousing in particular were, according to the Valencian 
hygienist José Estellés Salarich, key measures for prevention and control of the disease 
(Bernabeu-Mestre, 2007, p.125-133). The postwar shortages also affected soap and all types 
of disinfectant; despite this, the Franco authorities did not hesitate to export oil – the 
prime ingredient of soap – and other agricultural products to Germany (Del Arco Blanco, 
2006, p.253-255). A third factor intimately linked to the appearance and development 
of typhus was overcrowding, since there is a close inverse relationship between excessive 
population density, hygiene services to homes, and the health of citizens (Harden, 1993). 
Lastly, it is worth pointing out that improvement in living conditions has been identified 
as the determining factor in the disappearance of typhus in urban settings in the United 
Kingdom, especially London, in the last third of the nineteenth century (Hardy, 1988).
From mid-1937 on, the Spanish population’s health began to decline steadily, but 
it was not until immediately after the war that epidemic typhus broke out, along with 
other diseases (Barona Vilar, 2001, p.354). In fact, the first typhus cases were diagnosed 
in Madrid in April 1939; in June there were more in Malaga, Murcia and Cuenca; and in 
September in Villarrobledo (Albacete). Later, the Director General for Health, José Alberto 
Palanca (1941, p.438-439), acknowledged that “starting in winter 1939, he was convinced 
we would end up facing a difficult situation.” Given this statement, we can deduce that 
the Francoist health authorities were aware that the poor hygiene and health of a large 
part of the population during the postwar period would lead to a health crisis, but they 
claimed that those deficiencies were part and parcel of the chaos on the Republican side. 
The reality, as reflected in various international reports, is that during the Spanish Civil 
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War, exanthematic typhus never became a serious public health problem on either side of 
the conflict (Barona Vilar, J., 2006, p.13, 17, 20; Barona Vilar, Perdiguero Gil, 2008, p.103-
126). As a prophylactic measure, the Republican army had mobile disinfestation units that 
could be deployed on the front line (Bernabeu-Mestre, 2007, p.115).
During the winter and spring of 1940, two major foci for the epidemic emerged, with 
over four hundred cases recorded in total (Palanca, 1943b, p.364): one among the prisoners 
crammed into an old sugar factory in Guadix (Granada) and another in an asylum for 
beggars in Seville. However, in spring 1941, the epidemic grew sharply worse, which made 
the health authorities acknowledge it as exceptional: “The situation could not be more 
difficult or more tragic, and I believe that in epidemiological terms there has been nothing 
like it in the whole of this century; we have to go back to the cholera outbreaks in the past 
to find a parallel” (Palanca, 1941, p.434).
The epidemic developed unevenly, around four foci where the majority of the cases 
were reported – the provinces of Madrid (2,592), Malaga (1,830), Seville (1,224), Granada 
(1,055) and Cadiz (729) – and another series of secondary foci, notably Valencia (397), 
Cordoba (299), and Murcia (255) (Vidal Jordana, 1943, p.577). Obviously, these figures are 
for cases that were officially recorded; however, the real numbers could have been much 
higher (Del Arco Blanco, 2006, p.253-254).
Following the epidemiological cycle, the summer heat helped control the disease – 
since it destroyed the vector – and, in October 1941, Malaga, Murcia, Seville, Cordoba and 
Valencia were declared disease-free. However, in the first half of 1942, the epidemic came 
back, especially in the province of Barcelona, where 1,852 cases were recorded, with 407 
deaths (Vidal Jordana, 1946, p.41). Thus Barcelona, which had scarcely been affected by 
the first wave of the typhus epidemic, was hit hard in 1942. It seems likely that alarm was 
raised by the death on February 1st of Manuel Corachán García (Marí Balcells, 1981), a 
renowned surgeon who had been minister for Health for the Catalan government in 1936 
(El muy ilustre..., 5 feb. 1942). According to a widely-read newspaper, La Vanguardia, his 
funeral was attended by “a great many people, amongst whom were Barcelona’s leading 
medical practitioners” (Funerales…, 7 feb. 1942). It is no coincidence that the following 
day, a Sunday, the same newspaper reported that the Swiss physician and bacteriologist 
Hermann Mooser (1891-1971) had arrived for an indefinite stay. Mooser was Director of 
the Hygiene Institute at the University of Zurich and one of the world’s greatest experts 
on exanthematic typhus (En breve…, 8 feb. 1942). During his stay in Barcelona, funded 
and promoted by the city government, Mooser advised the municipal health authorities 
on what preventive measures to take, particularly in terms of producing vaccines, and he 
gave various lectures in professional settings such as the Faculty of Medicine, the Royal 
Academy of Medicine and, in April that year, at the Hospital del Mar in Barcelona, which 
was then the Municipal Hospital for Infectious Patients (Mooser, 1943).
Other important foci were Madrid (1,831 cases) and Cadiz (1,294); cities more moderately 
infected included Granada (712), Seville (479), Malaga (424), and Valencia (182) (Vidal Jordana, 
1946, p.41). Eventually, the epidemic of exanthematic typhus was pronounced over in 1943, 
which meant that the health authorities could turn their attention to “ordinary infectious 
diseases” in the country: typhoid fever, diphtheria, and dysentery (Palanca, 1943a, p.305).
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In terms of the central government’s response to the epidemic, in late 1939, it allocated 
one million pesetas in funding, but it was used mainly for the Madrid population, buying 
tents, delousing equipment (heaters and hydrogen cyanide fumigators),1 creating two new 
wards for infectious patients at the Hospital del Rey, and building a disinfection station 
there (Palanca, 1941, p.436). Other hospitals designated for epidemic patients were the 
Princesa, the Niño Jesús and the Instituto Oftálmico (Palanca, 1943b, p.368). In early 1940, 
the General Directorate for Health also formed the Epidemics Board (Junta de Epidemias), 
to liaise with the different provincial health authorities to coordinate the battle against 
typhus. Subsequently, in 1943, Palanca would pool the experience of health care providers in 
a dozen provincial health authorities in the campaign against the disease (Palanca, 1943c).
As we now know, a major outbreak of exanthematic typhus occurred in the spring of 
1941. All the government’s measures proved insufficient due to the lack of infrastructure, 
equipment and medical personnel, as the General Director for Health acknowledged: “I 
believed a national catastrophe was inevitable, not just because it was widespread … but 
also because of the shortage of methods for combatting it” (Palanca, 1941, p.433). In June 
1941, José Alberto Palanca (p.438) went to visit the most hard-hit provinces; and described 
how, in Malaga, the patients were not isolated but crowded together in dire conditions in 
houses, while in Granada he found the health care services to be “appalling.”
The health authorities knew the epidemiology of the disease, as seen in the numerous 
monographs published at the time, which stressed the need to isolate patients and eliminate 
the disease vector, namely, lice (Moróder, 1941, p.164; Clavero del Campo, Pérez Gallardo, 
1941; Quintana López, Díaz de Rada, 1942). In order to isolate typhus cases, Palanca 
(1943c, p.3) himself insisted that early diagnosis was the basis for any health campaign. 
However, patients were not being isolated effectively, so the epidemic was spreading easily, 
as Palanca (1941, p.436) noted sarcastically: “Everything possible was done to make sure 
the epidemic would spread widely throughout the country, and it must be confessed that 
this was successful.”
The regime’s inability to confront and manage this health crisis forced the Franco 
administration to request help from the international medical community. Arguing that 
“two and a half years of war distracted us from world-wide medical developments and it 
was crucial we find out what advances had been made in the prevention of exanthematic 
typhus” (Palanca, 1941, p.439), the authorities arranged for the American professor John 
C. Snyder to visit Spain. He was taken to some of the affected areas and taught Spanish 
experts how to prepare the typhus vaccine, especially the Cox vaccine (Rodríguez Ocaña, 
2014, p.476). At the time, the Roosevelt administration was signaling concern that typhus 
might prove a threat in international warfare. In 1942, Herald R. Cox was appointed to 
head the Typhus Commission, charged with finding an effective typhus vaccine that was 
easy to produce, so as to supply the US army. Vaccination against typhus also occupied 
most of the medical efforts made by the Spanish army (Gracián Casado, 1941).
Likewise, two prestigious members of the Pasteur Institute in Paris – Paul Giroud 
and André Alfred Lemierre – were sent to Madrid by the French Embassy, for the same 
reason (Palanca, 1941, p.439). Even more importantly, in the framework of medical 
internationalism in the “New Europe,” the regime increased its public health collaboration 
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with Nazi Germany, especially with regard to exanthematic typhus, arranging for exchanges 
of experts and the development of specific programs (Brydan, 2016, p.295-301). Among 
others, the physicians Miguel Gracián Casado and Julián Sanz Ibáñez were commissioned 
to travel to Germany to receive the necessary training to be able to create and produce 
typhus vaccines (Palanca, 1941, p.439).
As Jiménez Lucena states, the image of a healthy country that the regime was trying 
to project was undermined by the presence of infectious and contagious diseases. These 
contradictions were solved by the regime’s propaganda apparatus, which drew connections 
between these diseases and the losing side. The same legitimation strategy was used by the 
Nazi health authorities in their own country to exercise political control over groups of 
the population considered “undesirable” (Brydan, 2016, p.304). Also, references to the 
higher incidence of infection among the poor did not acknowledge the epidemic’s 
relationship to the dire social and economic circumstances and the health care system, 
but rather blamed the victims, treating individual behavior as responsible for the disease 
a person was suffering from (Jiménez Lucena, 1994, p.189, 194-195). This strategy tended 
to fail, as the health care authorities themselves realized: “The measures against begging 
failed thanks to the continual influx of poor people from all over Spain. They could be 
made to disappear from the stairs of the metro, but then they had to be shut up in ruined 
houses in the barrio of Argüelles, which worked out the same for us” (Palanca, 1943b, p.366).
Similarly, the new administration avoided assuming responsibility by arguing 
that Spanish doctors were not equipped to diagnose the disease because of the lack of 
exanthematic typhus while they were being trained. The health authorities also attempted 
to minimize the situation in Spain, claiming that typhus was an international problem 
that affected Mediterranean countries (Palanca, 1941, p.439). John C. Snyder (1947, p.5-
6), however, thought that war was the true cause of the numerous cases of typhus being 
reported across Europe, except in France and the United Kingdom; he stated that after 
1940, “epidemic typhus broke out in a series of countries that were normally free of the 
disease, especially Spain, Italy, and Germany,” as well as others such as Poland.
On August 2, 1941, the state allocated a fund of three million pesetas for the rest of the 
year and ten million more for 1942 (Palanca, 1943b, p.371). It subsequently ruled that 
the typhus epidemic was under control, and as a result of this a law passed on September 
19, 1942 redistributed the funds to deal with endemic diseases, such as syphilis and malaria 
(España, 1 oct. 1942).
Repression and social exclusion in Valencia as public health measures
The city of Valencia, which was situated in the rearguard during the conflict, experienced 
demographic growth that continued in the postwar years. Between 1939 and 1949 it became 
the third largest city in Spain thanks to inter- and intra-provincial immigration (Ortega 
Osona, Silvestre Rodríguez, 2006, p.90). A testimony from the time provides eloquent 
testimony to this: “In Alicante the beggars were thrown out and they all took refuge in 
our province [Valencia]. The highway was a pilgrimage … Whole families were constantly 
arriving from Andalusia” (Vidal Jordana, 1946, p.10).
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Indeed, the city went from 386,427 inhabitants in 1936 to 443,286 in 1940 (Pérez Puchal, 
1973, p.132), a population spike that took place over a short period of time and was not 
matched by an increase in urban resources. An example of this situation was the undermining 
of medical infrastructure during the civil war, especially the hospital system (García Ferrandis, 
2015; García Ferrandis, Martínez-Vidal, 2016). After the war, the high concentration of the 
population living in sub-human conditions translated into the outbreak of certain diseases, 
such as exanthematic typhus. Thus, during the two-year period of 1941-1942, a little over 
296 low-income government housing units were built in the whole city, many of them 
with shoddy materials (Peñín Ibañez, 1978, p.183-184, p.191-199). These data attest to the 
appearance of the most basic of living conditions, where sub-letting and overcrowding were 
the order of the day. Even the regime’s press acknowledged the city’s housing problems, 
declaring that “the urgency of the problem will necessarily create the solution, of a number 
of housing units that are cleaner, more sunny, and altogether more hygienic” (Aspecto…, 4 
feb. 1942). What was especially serious was the appearance of the phenomenon of a shanty-
town along the river Turia, from Mislata to Natzaret, near the mouth of the river (Palacio 
Lis, Ruiz Rodrigo, 1993, p.15). Some of the shacks can be seen in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Shanty-town along the River Turia (Vidal Jordana, 1946, p.51)
As in other Spanish cities, in Valencia in the spring of 1941 an epidemic of exanthematic 
typhus was declared, and the segment of the population affected was defined. In its urge 
to blame the most disadvantaged sectors, the regime simplified the cause of the typhus 
outbreak in the city, assuring that it originated among unemployed workers from the 
province of Cordoba who were living rough in the port area, in houses destroyed during 
the war (Palanca, 1941, p.435-436). In the spring of 1941, some 180 people from Andalusia 
and Castile were crammed into the ruins of the Hotel del Puerto: “People were lying on the 
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ground, half naked and pretty much exposed to the elements, since little more than the 
four walls were still standing; they huddled together in the most protected spots” (Vidal 
Jordana, 1946, p.10). This dramatic testimony comes from Javier Vidal Jordana, a physician 
who was named Director of the Epidemiology Section of Valencia’s Provincial Institute for 
Hygiene in 1932 (Barona Vilar, C., 2006, p.267-268, 274-278) and kept his post throughout 
the purges carried out by the Francoist authorities after the war (Vidal Jordana, 1946, p.61-
63). The problem was a hard one to solve, because according to Valeriano Jiménez de la 
Iglesia, spokesman for the Construction Workers’ Union, the number of housing units that 
needed to be built to make up the deficit ranged from fifteen to twenty thousand, which, 
combined with the sharp price increase for urban lots – speculation in the city center – 
meant developing the existing suburbs and creating new neighborhoods on the outskirts 
for the middle and working classes (Ginés i Sánchez, 2010, p.155-162).
Officially, the 1941 typhus epidemic affected a total of 284 residents of the city of 
Valencia, of whom 35 died (Palanca, 1941, p.436). The three cities most affected by the 
disease were Malaga (1,839), Madrid (1,396), and Seville (945). The death rate in the city 
of Valencia was 12.4%, slightly below the 14.3% reported by Palanca (1941, p.367) for 
Spain overall.
The summer heat noticeably decreased the number of patients in the city and in October 
1941, the epidemic was declared under control. However, starting in February 1942, typhus 
began reappearing, with cases reported in the port area and a municipal hostel where 
beggars spent the night crammed together. Another focus was reported in the canteens 
of the Valencian Charity Association (Asociación Valenciana de Caridad) (Vidal Jordana, 
1946, p.19-20). The 1942 epidemic was not as major as the previous spring, since 158 cases 
were diagnosed and 28 deaths were certified (p.35), a death rate of 17.7%. Lastly, in 1943, 
there were only five cases in the city, one of whom died (p.37).
As for an institutional response to the epidemic, it should be said that in Valencia, as 
in the case of Malaga (Jiménez Lucena, 1994, p.50-51), it was led by the city government 
(Ayuntamiento de Valencia) in collaboration with the Provincial Council (Diputación 
Provincial). In Valencia, municipal anti-typhus measures followed one of three main points: 
creation of a health authority to control public and private space, exclusion of the most 
disadvantaged sectors of the population, and isolation and treatment for those affected. 
In terms of creating a health authority, on May 13, 1940, the city government approved 
regulations for a Municipal Health Police Force (Cuerpo de Policía Sanitaria Municipal), 
charged with inspecting public and private spaces (Pleno…, 2 mayo 1940). Composed of 
forty officers, its basic function was to check whether municipal anti-typhus measures were 
being followed, such as, for example, “instructions for cleaning and disinfection of vehicles 
in the public transport service” (Campaña contra…, 1941). These measures also mandated 
disinfection of private vehicles (taxis, carriages etc.), and drivers who did not comply were 
fined (Desinfección…, 30 mayo 1941, 14 jun. 1941). Therefore, the fundamental task of 
the health police was to fight exanthematic typhus and other infectious diseases through 
prevention, but based on coercive measures.
The second pillar for the city government’s anti-typhus campaign was exclusion of the 
most disadvantaged sectors of the population. It is worth recalling that after the war, a 
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large number of people were living in bombed-out buildings, especially around the port 
and maritime areas. Franco himself witnessed this destruction in a visit to Valencia on 
the second anniversary of the entry of his troops into the city (El Caudillo…, 1 abr. 1941); 
as well as a lack of adequate housing, there were numerous beggars and vagabonds on 
the city streets: “The begging was overwhelming. Everywhere there were people in rags, 
carrying parasites” (Vidal Jordana, 1946, p.10). It was precisely these most disadvantaged 
sectors of the population who were most affected by the disease, and the city government 
orchestrated a set of repressive measures designed to exclude them from society. Just as in 
Malaga, in Valencia there was a tendency to blame those affected, claiming that “dealing 
with these indigent people with all kinds of social defects is very difficult, since it requires 
combining the necessary discipline with a modicum of humanity” (Vidal Jordana, 1946, 
p.13-14). The city government set up a shelter on Velázquez Street for beggars from outside 
the city. It also built two shelters for beggars from the city: one was situated on Travesia 
de la Mar, serving inhabitants of the slums in the port district, while the other, which 
was next to the Valencian Charity Association, functioned as an extra building for the 
institution (Memoria…, 30 sep. 1941). Beggars were isolated in these shelters, deloused, 
and given a certificate that they were parasite-free. They were also given basic health 
care. Subsequently, beggars who were not from the city of Valencia were “evacuated” to 
their home towns. In the spring of 1941, this social exclusion policy affected some three 
thousand people, many of whom jumped off the train immediately after leaving Valencia 
and fled. These measures displayed a high degree of cynicism and paternalism on the part 
of Francoist municipal authorities: “We could have resolved, as in other places, to send 
people back to their home towns … However, we decided to evacuate the entire floating 
population whenever we could do it in a humanitarian way, with the minimal health 
guarantees” (Vidal Jordana, 1946, p.12).
As Jiménez Lucena (1994, p.195) has demonstrated, in terms of blaming the victim, 
beggars figured prominently in notes in the press; after June 19, 1941, there was a series 
of calls for donations in the Valencian press, signed by the civil governor. The funds were 
for the “campaign to evacuate beggars from other regions,” and were aimed at private 
individuals, institutions and companies; with this same “charitable goal,” a raffle and three 
open-air dances were held in the Jardines de Viveros; these were announced by splashy 
headlines (Campaña pro-evacuación…, 19 jun. 1941, 27 jun. 1941). Thus, the campaign for 
expelling the beggars was orchestrated by the civil government, which used the Francoist 
press as a mouthpiece. Another of the measures enacted involved fines and arrests of any 
concierges who allowed beggars into their buildings (Nota…, 11 jun. 1941). Finally, it should 
be stressed that the city’s own beggars had no more luck, since three hundred of them were 
“taken in” by the health police and “stowed” in the municipal shelter, where they were kept 
“with almost no food” and “out in the open.” These hard conditions, without the necessary 
isolation, in turn provoked eighty new cases of exanthematic typhus (Vidal Jordana, 1946, 
p.13). Although these measures were aimed at preventing the disease and might seem 
correct from an epidemiological point of view, we do not hesitate to describe them as 
“repressive” because they were carried out against people’s will (expulsions, confinement 
in unhealthy spaces, penalties etc.), they were based on blaming the patients, and because 
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they were taken despite the context of a shortage of soap and a lack of running water and 
even food, in many homes. After the war, municipal policy, encouraged by the Mayor, 
Joaquín Manglano (1892-1985), the Baron of Cárcer, focused more on urban speculation 
in the city center – the so-called Avenida del Oeste was one of his emblematic projects – 
than on repairing the bombed neighborhoods or building adequate housing for workers 
on the outskirts of the city (Ginés i Sánchez, 2010, p.138-158).
The third axis of the city’s struggle against typhus was isolation and treatment of those 
affected, so in 1941 two former cholera hospitals in the nineteenth century were repurposed. 
Firstly, the Hospital de San Pablo was turned into a delousing station (Pleno…, 27 ene. 
1943). Also, the Hospital de San Antonio, inaugurated in May 1914 (Inauguración…, 16 
mayo 1914), was re-opened and re-named the “Municipal Hospital for Infectious Patients;” 
it held fifty patients and was located on the grounds where the El Cid Municipal Hospital 
would later be built, with building starting in October 1941 (Memoria…, 30 sep. 1941). 
Figure 2 shows the former isolation hospital reconverted into a typhus hospital.
Figure 2: Municipal Hospital for Infectious Patients (Vidal Jordana, 1946, p.48)
The Provincial Council, meanwhile, improvised a small facility for infectious patients 
in part of a farm it owned in the Safranar district, very close to the Municipal Hospital 
for Infectious Patients (Memoria…, 30 sep. 1941). This facility became known as the “La 
Granja Hospital for Infectious Patients” (Hospital de Infecciosos de la Granja). It held forty 
beds, although during the 1941 epidemic, tents had to be erected in the garden to house 
more patients (Vidal Jordana, 1946, p.13). The physical proximity of both hospitals and 
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the intensity of the typhus epidemic led to close collaboration between Valencia’s city 
government and the Provincial Council, which involved some dispute over who would 
pay for housing and feeding the sick (El Sr. Alcalde…, 24 mar. 1941). Even the Director 
General for Health echoed this circumstance: “In Valencia the problem lay in clarifying 
how much of the expense caused by the epidemic should be met by the Provincial 
Council and how much by the city government” (Palanca, 1941, p.438). To prevent new 
misunderstandings from hampering the fight against typhus, members of both institutions 
met to determine “rules for work and finances to coordinate which services will be covered 
by the Right Honorable Provincial Council and which by the Right Honorable City Hall 
in the campaign against exanthematic typhus and other infections” (Normas…, 1941). 
Lastly, we should stress that the largest hospital in the city – the Provincial Hospital of 
Valencia – was only involved for a limited period in the spring of 1941, since it had no 
isolation ward and no equipment for delousing the patients (Vidal Jordana, 1946, p.11).
Despite all these efforts, the actions of Valencia’s city and provincial governments during 
the 1941 outbreak were clearly inadequate, since they basically involved repurposing old 
isolation hospitals and improvising an anti-infection facility in a set of farm buildings. 
This lackluster management by the Valencian health authorities is obvious in the Director 
General of Health’s description, a few years later, of the situation while the outbreak was in 
full swing: “In June 1941, Valencia had over 200 typhus patients and not a single hospital to 
house them, to the point that for many weeks they stayed at home, in extremely unhealthy 
conditions, as is natural. There was only one delousing station, full of defects and half 
broken” (Palanca, 1943b, p.369).
In the summer of 1941, the Valencian administrations realized the seriousness of the 
problem, and, taking advantage of the improvement caused by the summer heat, they 
launched new initiatives. Firstly, the Provincial Council planned to construct an infectious 
diseases hospital on the site of a farm they owned. Meanwhile, the city government 
decided to launch a very ambitious project: constructing a brand-new, large infectious 
diseases hospital to be built on the grounds of the old, overcrowded Municipal Hospital 
for Infectious Patients (Sánchez Muñoz, 2011, p.79-88).
The Provincial Council presented the Directorate General for Health with a project 
for constructing a new infectious diseases hospital, and requested one hundred thousand 
pesetas in funding in March 1942. However, this request was turned down because “the 
funding is for expenses for the ongoing epidemic, not for buildings that could not help ward 
off an epidemic” (El Ministerio…, 11 abr. 1942). In November 1942, when the Council had 
already invested 343,992 pesetas (El arquitecto…, 27 nov. 1942), it once again requested help 
from the state. However, the Directorate General for Health rejected the request, arguing 
that according to the law of September 19, 1942, the monies were not for hospitals but for 
“techno-medical facilities” (La Dirección…, 13 mayo 1943).
Meanwhile, on September 17, 1941, the city government approved construction of a 
new infectious diseases hospital named El Cid Municipal Hospital for Infectious Patients 
(Pleno…, 17 sep. 1941). The municipal authorities were aware of the magnitude of the 
epidemic that had been going on since the spring and they insisted on the need to build 
this hospital, so work began on October 26, 1941. The project for the El Cid Hospital 
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included three floors holding four hundred beds, to be built “on the grounds currently 
occupied by the municipal isolation hospital” (Proyecto…, 8 sep. 1941). However, in its 
request for funds from the state, the city government referred to “construction to enlarge 
the current municipal isolation hospital” (Solicitud…, 27 oct. 1941). We believe this 
ambiguity meant that municipal authorities wanted to get around the funding rules, 
which stipulated that financing would not be granted for construction, so they presented 
the project as enlarging a prior construction instead of a brand-new building (which it 
in fact was). The city government described its intention as follows: “After any period 
of infection is over, the populace of Valencia always presents a number of infectious 
diseases that, while not reaching the level of an epidemic, do generate considerable 
numbers … always encountering the serious obstacle of the lack of resources” (Proyecto…, 
8 sep. 1941).
However, the Directorate General for Health felt that building a hospital from scratch was 
not an efficient way to combat an ongoing epidemic, so it only granted the city fifty thousand 
pesetas from funds provided by the state (Pleno…, 20 abr. 1942), a meager sum bearing in 
mind that the budget for the proposed El Cid Municipal Hospital for Infectious Patients was 
a total of 4,314,430 pesetas (Proyecto…, 8 sep. 1941). At this point, it is worth highlighting 
that the mayor of Valencia during this period, Joaquín Manglano, was one of the leading 
figures among the Valencian Carlists.2 Manglano, an aristocrat who represented the local land-
owning oligarchy, was not completely in agreement with the goals of the General Directorate 
for Health, led by José Alberto Palanca, a military officer and monarchist who supported the 
restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in the person of Alfonso XIII (1886-1941), who had 
been living in Italy since the proclamation of the Second Republic in 1931.
Figure 3: Construction on the El Cid Municipal Hospital Municipal for Infectious Patients, c.1943 (Vidal Jordana, 1946, p.48)
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Reality ultimately proved the Directorate General for Health to be right, since work on 
the new infectious diseases hospital had to be suspended in late 1943, when the typhus 
epidemic was deemed to be under control. The high final cost of the project meant that 
the city could not afford the maintenance and management costs, and at the end of the 
decade, the hospital – which was actually only half-built – was handed over to the National 
Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Previsión) and became part of the Social Security 
network, under the Ministry of Labor. It was renamed the “General Sanjurjo Nursing 
Home,” and eventually developed into the current Dr. Peset University Hospital (Sánchez 
Muñoz, 2011, p.88-90).
Returning to the chronology of the epidemic, in the spring of 1942 there was an upturn 
in cases, which underscored the state’s judgement that building hospital infrastructure 
was not an effective way of “preventing an epidemic” (El Ministerio…, 11 abr. 1942). This 
upturn once again betrayed gaps in the health care system; for example, the Infectious 
Patients’ Hospital at La Granja did not possess effective delousing equipment: boilers, water 
heaters and “hydrogen cyanide chambers,” as recommended by public health manuals at 
the time (Moróder, 1941; Clavero del Campo, Pérez Gallardo, 1941; Quintana López, Díaz 
de Rada, 1942). Likewise, there was no typhus vaccine available for health care workers, 
nor clean clothes for the patients (La Jefatura…, 1 abr. 1942). Meanwhile, throughout 1942, 
the strategy of blaming the patients continued. It is in this context that we should place 
this press report about cleanliness as the essential way to combat the disease: “We know 
the disease, how it propagates, and what its prophylactic antidote is: the most immaculate 
cleanliness. But it has to be collective. Defense must be of an offensive nature … and an 
intensified attack must be waged on slovenly and dirty people” (Contra…, 26 feb. 1942).
Curiously, on the same page in the newspaper is another report on soap rationing. 
Furthermore, after the Civil Government identified the working class as another group 
responsible for the latest typhus outbreak, obligatory showers were instituted so employees 
did not have to miss work, and shaved hair was required for “all those workers whose 
external appearance does not offer guarantees of conscientious daily hygiene” (Planas de 
Tovar, 18 mar. 1942). The reappearance of the disease caused a rise in repressive measures, 
which points to an implicit recognition that the local health authorities were unable to 
get the crisis back under control.
Final considerations
In the period immediately after the war in Spain, the ideal three conditions converged 
for an exanthematic typhus outbreak: hunger, poor hygiene, and overcrowding. The 
Francoist health authorities, however, were aware that acknowledging their failure to deal 
with this sensitive socio-medical issue would hinder legitimization of the regime. As a 
result, they articulated a discourse surrounding the causes of the epidemic that followed 
the argument of “winners and losers,” which tended to blur the lines between controlling 
disease and maintaining public order. José Alberto Palanca maintained that the hardship 
and malnutrition suffered by the Republican zone in particular had caused the appearance 
of the epidemic at the end of the war. Palanca also boasted that in the Rebel zone there 
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were no supply problems. According to this thinking which can be described as simplistic 
at best, the incidence of typhus in cities and provinces where the military coup won early 
victories, such as Granada, Seville and Cadiz, should have been minimal, whereas in fact 
it was the exact opposite. On the other hand, the typhus epidemic in Valencia should have 
resulted in a high numbers of cases; however, our work shows that the morbimortality 
figures in Valencia were in fact rather modest. All of this would seem to indicate, then, 
that political propaganda on the part of the regime played an important role in the 
visible struggle against the typhus epidemic that devastated Spain in the early postwar 
years, which coincided with the early years of World War II and the framework of health 
internationalism in the “New Europe,” led by Nazi Germany.
As for the city of Valencia, we have identified that social exclusion mechanisms were used 
by the local authorities to prevent the typhus epidemic from undermining legitimization of 
the new regime. Besides political propaganda, these mechanisms were deployed in measures 
against those affected, such as penalties, expulsions and confinement in unhealthy spaces, 
actions that allow us to see that the local Francoist authorities simplified the concept of a 
health campaign, reducing it to a question of public order.
On the other hand, local health officials in Valencia decided to plan construction of a 
large hospital; however, we believe the goal of this project was not really to fight typhus, 
since building a hospital while an epidemic is going on cannot be considered an effective 
way to fight the disease. Our hypothesis is backed by Francoist legislation at the time, since 
neither the funding approved in 1941 nor the law of September 19, 1942 were intended to 
finance hospitals. The mayor of Valencia’s goal was, rather, to finance a municipal hospital 
by using the funding in an exceptional epidemiological context. We should keep in mind 
the possibility of clashes between different factions of the Francoist movement over control 
of health policy. On the one hand were the Carlists, who included the mayor of Valencia; 
and on the other were the military monarchists, who included José Alberto Palanca, the 
Director General for Health; and lastly, there was the Falange, the ruling fascist party, 
controlled by Franco, that enacted Mandatory Health Insurance (Seguro Obligatorio de 
Enfermedad) in 1942 (España, 27 dic. 1942).
Once local health authorities had embarked on building a large hospital, and gone into 
debt, they did not devote their limited resources to the disease-control measures advocated 
by epidemiologists at the time: delousing methods (based on heat: boilers, stoves, water 
heaters; chemical methods: hydrogen cyanide chambers), acquiring typhus vaccines, 
distributing clean clothes among the sick, and building low-income government housing.
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noTeS
1 This is a technique for curing infestations of parasites or rats, and it was much used at the time, both in 
ships and in buildings. It involved fumigation of a closed space with hydrogen cyanide, a highly poisonous, 
volatile liquid. 
2 Ever since the reign of Fernando VII (1784-1833), the Carlists had advocated the legitimacy of a different 
line of succession than the Bourbon monarchy, setting off a dynastic struggle that sparked three wars 
during the course of the nineteenth century. During the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), Alfonso Carlos 
de Borbón, along with his supporters, the so-called Carlists (who saw him as the legitimate heir to the 
throne), gave all their moral, economic and logistic support to the rebel side led by General Franco, making 
a decisive contribution to the victory of the military and the establishment of an authoritarian regime 
that has been described as “national Catholicism.”
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